Freedom and Value: Freedom's Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value

Chapter 1. Introduction: On the Values of Lives and Worlds 1.1. The Focus of Inquiry: The Freedom of Axiological Judgments 1.2. Synopsis Chapter 2. Attitudinal Hedonism 2.1. Simple Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 2.2. Some Merits of Attitudinal Hedonism 2.2.1. A Problem Concerning Nonexistent Pleasures 2.2.2. A Problem Concerning False Pleasures 2.2.3. A Problem Concerning Base Pleasures Chapter 3. Freedom-sensitive Versions of Attitudinal Hedonism 3.1. The Freedom of Attitudes 3.2. Neo's Case 3.3. In Support of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism 3.4. Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.1. Robust Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.2. Asymmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.3. Symmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.4. Pain Adjusted Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.5. Freedom and Well-Being 3.6. Objections and Replies 3.6.1. Welfare Relevant versus World Relevant Factors 3.6.2. Freedom and Manipulation 3.6.3. Freedom and Unbidden Pleasures 3.6.4. Unfree Pleasures and Value Chapter 4. Pleasure, Desert, and Welfare 4.1. Pleasure and Desert 4.2. Why be Drawn to Simple Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism? 4.2.1. Ross's Two-Worlds Objection 4.3. On the Value of Worlds and Lives 4.4. The Freedom of Our Decisions 4.5. Authentic versus Inauthentic Springs of Action 4.6. Authentic Springs of Action and Value 4.7. Freedom, Desert, andValue 4.8. Freedom and the Value of Action-Based Pleasures Chapter 5. Authentic Springs of Action 5.1. Authenticity and Welfare 5.2. A Comparison with Noggle's Account 5.3. Some Objections and Responses 5.4. Authenticity and Well-Being: An Objection 5.5. Authenticity and Well-Being: Another Objection Chapter 6. Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Desert, and Value 6.1. Subject's-Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, Lives, and Worlds 6.2. Some Source Incompatibilist Presuppositions 6.3. Some Principles 6.4. The Argument from Control 6.5. The Argument from Desert 6.6. The Argument from Authenticity 6.7. Compatibilism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds 6.8. Libertarianism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds Appendix A: On Determinism, Randomness, and Desert Chapter 7. Freedom, Obligation, and the Good 7.1. Obligation, Freedom, and the Value of Worlds 7.2. Determinism, Alternative Possibilities, and Obligation 7.3. Ross's Objection Revisited 7.4. A Remaining Problem Concerning Freedom with Subject's Desert- Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 7.5. Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive World-Ranking Axiologies 7.6. On the Value of Worlds and Moral Obligation 7.7. The Value of Worlds and the Repugnant Conclusion 7.7.1. An Objection to Totalism: The Repugnant Conclusion 7.7.2. A Response to Parfit Concerns Regarding Totalism 7.8. Inauthenticity and Obligation 7.8.1. Freedom's Bearing on the Value of Worlds 7.8.2. Inauthenticity and the Undoing of Moral Obligation 7.9. Conclusion Chapter 8.