Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory

List of Tables
Acknowledgements
INTRODUCTION
PART I: ETHICS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
1. Distinguishing Truth from Seeming-Truth
2. Seven Principles of Theory-Selection
2.1. Firm Foundations
2.2. Internal Coherence
2.3. External Coherence
2.4. Explanatory Power
2.5. Unity
2.6. Parsimony
2.7. Fruitfulness
3. The Case for Instrumentalism
3.1. The Firmest Foundation
3.2. The Promise of Parsimony, Unity, Explanatory Power, and Fruitfulness
3.3. Advantages over Alternatives
3.3.1. Advantages over Intuitionism
3.3.2. Advantages over Reflective Equilibrium
3.3.3. Advantages over Moral-Language Analysis
3.3.4. Advantages over Constitutivism
3.3.5. Advantages over Second and Third-Personalism
3.3.6. Advantages over Sterba's Dialecticalism
3.3.7. Conclusion
4. Disarming Initial Concerns
4.1. The Wrong Kinds of Reasons?
4.2. Not a Firm Foundation?
4.3. Unconvincing and Artificial?
4.4. Three Promissory Notes
4.4.1. Not the Wrong Kinds of Reasons?
4.4.2. Firm Foundations After All?
4.4.3. Convincing and Intuitive?
5. Conclusion
PART II: THE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SELVES
1. Our Capacities to Care about Our Past and Future
2. The Problem of Possible Future Selves
2.1. Possible Futures
2.2. Possible Psychologies
2.3. Possible Choices
2.4. A Very Real Problem
3. Morality as the Solution?
4. Is the Problem Too Contingent?
5. Two Nonsolutions
5.1. Nonsolution 1: Probable Futures
5.2. Nonsolution 2: Diachronic Motivational Consistency
6. Conclusion: An Unsolved Problem
PART III: THE CATEGORICAL-INSTRUMENTAL IMPERATIVE
1. Interests in Diachronic Cooperation
2. Three Types of Interests
2.1. Involuntary Interests
2.2. Semivoluntary Interests
2.3. Voluntary Interests
3. The Categorical-Instrumental Imperative
4. Just Conscience?
5. An Intuitive Solution to the Problem of Possible Future Selves?
6. Conclusion
PART IV: THREE UNIFIED FORMULATIONS
1. The Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation
1.1. Possible Other-Human-Regarding Interests
1.2. Possible Nonhuman-Animal-Regarding Interests
1.3. Possible Sentient-Being-Regarding Interests
1.4. Derivation of the Humanity-and-Sentience Formulation
2. The Kingdom-of-Human-and-Sentient-Ends Formulation
3. Advantages over Kantian Ethics
3.1. Firmer Foundations
3.2. Greater Internal Coherence
3.3. Greater External Coherence
3.4. Greater Explanatory Power, Unity and Parsimony
3.5. Greater Fruitfulness
4. Conclusion
PART V: THE MORAL ORIGINAL POSITION
1. Rawls' Original Position
1.1. Rawls' Kantian Rationale
1.2. Rawls' Reflective-Equilibrium Rationale
1.3. Rawls' Public Reason Rationale
2. Some Common Critiques
2.1. Kantian Critiques
2.2. Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques
2.3. Public Reason Critiques
3. The Case for a Moral Original Position
4. Corroborating the Critiques
4.1. Corroborating Kantian Critiques
4.2. Corroborating Reflective-Equilibrium Critiques
4.3. Corroborating Public Reason Critiques
5. Conclusion
PART VI: RIGHTNESS AS FAIRNESS
1. Derivation of Four Principles of Fairness
1.1. The Principle of Negative Fairness
1.2. The Principle of Positive Fairness
1.3. The Principle of Fair Negotiation
1.4. The Principle of Virtues of Fairness
2. Rightness as Fairness: A Unified Standard of Right and Wrong
3. Rightness as Fairness in Practice: Principled Fair Negotiation
3.1. Kant's Four Cases
3.2. How Numbers Should Count: Trolleys, Torture, and Unwilling Organ Donors
3.3. World Poverty
3.4. Distribution of Scarce Medical Resources
3.5. The Ethical Treatment of Animals
4. Conclusion
PART VII: LIBERTARIAN EGALITARIAN COMMUNITARIANISM
1. Libertarianism, Egalitarianism, and Communitarianism
1.1. Libertarianism: Attractions and Critiques
1.2. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques
1.3. Egalitarianism: Attractions and Critiques
2. The Case for Libertarian Egalitarian Communitarianism
3. Additional Advantages
3.1. (Qualified) Fair Negotiation over Divisiveness
3.2. Resolving the Scope and Requirements of