Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs

1. Introduction
2. Phenomenal conservatism 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The basics of phenomenal conservatism 2.3 The nature of seemings 2.4 Supporting phenomenal conservatism 2.5 Preliminary criticism of phenomenal conservatism 2.6 Conclusions References
3. Cognitive penetrability 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Characterizing cognitive penetrability 3.3 The epistemic problem of cognitive penetrability 3.4 The reliabilist account 3.5 The inferentialist account 3.6 Taming cognitive penetrability 3.7 Conclusions References
4. The Bayesian objection 4.1 Introduction 4.2 White's objection 4.3 Responding to White's objection 4.4 Perceptual appearances and reflective justification 4.5 Conclusions References
5. Antiscepticism and easy justification
5.1 Introduction 5.2 Antiscepticism and reflective awareness 5.3 Easy justification objections 5.4 Answering the easy justification from closure objection 5.5 Answering the easy justification from bootstrapping objection 5.6 Conclusions References
6. Concluding remarks