Contemporary Debates in Epistemology

Notes on Contributors viiiPreface to the Second Edition xiiiPreface to the First Edition xiv1 Should Knowledge Come First? 1Knowledge First Timothy Williamson 1What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology? Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 10Experience First Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 17Knowledge Still First Timothy Williamson 22Still Nowhere Else to Start Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew 252 Is Knowledge Closed under Known Entailment? 27The Case against Closure Fred Dretske 27The Case for Closure John Hawthorne 40Reply to Hawthorne Fred Dretske 563 Is Knowledge Contextual? 60Contextualism Contested Earl Conee 60Contextualism Defended Stewart Cohen 69Contextualism Contested Some More Earl Conee 75Contextualism Defended Some More Stewart Cohen 794 Do Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know? 84Practical Matters Affect Whether You Know Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath 84Practical Matters Do Not Affect Whether You Know Baron Reed 955 Can Skepticism Be Refuted? 107The Refutation of Skepticism Jonathan Vogel 108The Challenge of Refuting Skepticism Richard Fumerton 1206 Are Intellectually Virtuous Motives Essential to Knowledge? 133Knowledge Need Not Be Virtuously Motivated Jason Baehr 133Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 140Reply to Zagzebski Jason Baehr 146Reply to Baehr Linda Zagzebski 1497 Can Knowledge Be Lucky? 152Knowledge Cannot Be Lucky Duncan Pritchard 152Knowledge Can Be Lucky Stephen Hetherington 1648 Is There a Priori Knowledge? 177In Defense of the a Priori Laurence BonJour 177There Is No a Priori Michael Devitt 185Reply to Devitt Laurence BonJour 195Reply to BonJour Michael Devitt 197Last Rejoinder Laurence BonJour 2009 Is There Immediate Justification? 202There Is Immediate Justification James Pryor 202There Is no Immediate Justification Juan Comesaña 222Reply to Comesaña James Pryor 235Reply to Pryor Juan Comesaña 23910 Can Belief Be Justified Through Coherence Alone? 244Non-foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability Catherine Z. Elgin 244Why Coherence Is Not Enough: A Defense of Moderate Foundationalism James Van Cleve 255Reply to Van Cleve Catherine Z. Elgin 267Reply to Elgin James Van Cleve 27111 Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? 274Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein 274Infinitism Is Not the Solution to the Regress Problem Carl Ginet 283Reply to Ginet Peter Klein 291Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 29512 Can Evidence Be Permissive? 298Evidence Can Be Permissive Thomas Kelly 298Evidence Cannot Be Permissive Roger White 31213 Is Justification Internal? 324Justification Is Not Internal John Greco 325Justification Is Internal Richard Feldman 33714 Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? 351Truth Is Not the Primary Epistemic Goal Jonathan L. Kvanvig 352Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis Marian David 363Index 378