Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
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Beschreibung
Part 1.- Chapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle.- Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi.- Part 2.- Chapter 3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S.Alves.- Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech elaniec.- Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio.- Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer.- Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli.- Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte.- Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi.- Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia.- Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette.- Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks.- Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Wolenski.- Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Zaluski.- Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi.
Eigenschaften
Breite: | 148 |
Höhe: | 210 |
Seiten: | 344 |
Sprachen: | Englisch |
Autor: | Edoardo Fittipaldi, Paolo Di Lucia |
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