Wundt, Avenarius, and Scientific Psychology: A Debate at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

Chapter 1. Introduction1.1 Wundt and the Rise of Scientific Psychology1.2 The Historiography of Wundtism1.3 Mach and Avenarius in the History of Philosophy1.4 The Aim of the Book
Chapter 2. Richard Avenarius2.1 Avenarius' Relationship with Wundt2.2 The Critique of Introjection2.3 Object and Purpose of Psychology2.4 Mach and Avenarius2.5 Psychophysical ParallelismChapter 3. Wilhelm Wundt and the Crisis in the Relationship with Avenarius3.1 The "Ideal-Realistic" Approach3.2 Physical and Psychical Causality3.3 Physiology and Psychology3.4 Psychology and the Spiritual Sciences3.5 The Break with AvenariusChapter 4. The Spread of the New Definition of Psychology4.1 The Repudiation of Wundt: Oswald Külpe's Grundriss4.2 A Philosophical Deepening: Hugo Münsterberg4.3 The Circle Widens: Ebbinghaus and Ward4.4 A Synthesis: E. B. Titchener (with a Digression on William James)Chapter 5. Wundt's Reaction
5.1 The Appropriation of the Definition of Psychology by Point of View5.2 Two Interpretations of Psychological Parallelism5.3 Against the Materialistic Definition of Psychology5.4 The Final Charge against Avenarius5.5 Closing Remarks