Collective Decision-Making:: Social Choice and Political Economy

Editor's Preface. Foreword; W.H. Riker. 1. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation; N. Schofield. Part I: Social Choice. 2. An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains; M. le Breton, J. Weymark. 3. Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formation; D.E. Campbell. 4. Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction; Yongsheng Xu. 5. Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting; D.G. Saari. Part II: Elections and Committees. 6. Electing Legislatures; D. Austen- Smith. 7. Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games; C.L. Eavey. 8. The Heart of a Polity; N. Schofield. 9. Refinements of the Heart; D. Austen-Smith. Part III: Coalition Governments. 10. Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan; J. Wada, N. Schofield. 11. An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament; F. Carreras, G. Owen. 12. Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation; B. Grofman. 13. The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models; B. Grofman, et al. 14. Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation; M. Laver, K. Shepsle. 15. The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly; C. Mershon. Part IV: Political Economy. 16. Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches; J. Potters, F. van Winden. 17. Partisan Electoral Cycles and Monetary Policy Games; R.B. Morton. 18. Hypothesis Testing and Collective Decision-Making; K.K. Ladha. 19. Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem; K.K. Ladha, G. Miller. Name Index. Subject Index.