Semi-Presidential Policy-Making in Europe: Executive Coordination and Political Leadership

1. Introduction 1.1. Aim and research questions 1.2. What is semi-presidentialism and what do we know about it? 1.3. Why study executive coordination in semi-presidential regimes? 1.4. Research design and data 1.5. Outline of the book
2. Institutions, Coordination, and Leadership 2.1. Institutional theory and policy coordination 2.2. Semi-presidentialism and the challenge of cooperation 2.3. Foreign policy and the challenge of leadership 2.4. Theoretical framework and coordination mechanisms
3. The Semi-Presidential Cases in Comparative Context 3.1. Semi-presidential regimes in Europe 3.2. Presidential power 3.3. President-cabinet conflict and cohabitation 3.4. Public trust in the president and other institutions 3.5. A comparative design with explorative ambitions
4. Formal Coordination Mechanisms 4.1. Establishing variation between Finland, Lithuania and Romania 4.2. Explaining the variation
5. Informal Avenues of Influence 5.1. Finland: constrained presidency 5.2. Lithuania: presidents stamping their authority 5.3. Romania: when mediation goes too far 5.4. Concluding discussion: 'where is it forbidden?'
6. Decision-Making in Foreign and Security Policies and EU Affairs 6.1. Finland: establishing a logical division of labour 6.2. Lithuania: presidential 'power grabs' 6.3. Romania: president as the undisputed leader in foreign affairs 6.4. Concluding reflections: consensus but potential for disputes
7. Conclusions 7.1. Informal avenues and political leadership 7.2. Popular and dangerous presidents?